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Indonesia rocked by unrest 
Since the demonstration in Tanjung Priok on 12 September 
when heavily-armed troops killed dozens of people who were 
calling for the release of four members of the local mosque, the 
political atmosphere in Jakarta has been shaken by a whole 
series of incidents, bombings, explosions and deliberately-
started fires in well-known shopping centres. Illegal leaflets are 
circulating in many cities, and there have been a large number of 
arrests. Newspapers report that some individuals , businesses and 
a few embassies have received calls warning of attacks. After 
years of apparent calm, the political atmosphere in Indonesia has 
suddenly become charged with uncertainty and a sense that there 
is widespread, organised opposition to the regime. 
Although General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces was quick off the mark, giving the press his 
version of the Tanjung Priok massacre and making it clear that 
no other explanation would be tolerated, he appears to have 
been at a loss since then to explain the many events that have 
rocked the capital and other cities. 
• On 4 October , three bombs exploded in major business 
districts. Two badly damaged branches of Indonesia's largest 
private banking corporation, the Bank of Central Asia, and the 
third damaged a shop near one of the bank branches. The BCA 
is owned by Liem Sioe Liong, Indonesia's richest financier and 
business magnate, and a very close business associate of the 
Suharto family . It has since been established that the third bomb 
was to have been used to blow up the headquarters of the BCA, 
but there was a last-minute change in plans because the head 
office was too heavily guarded by security forces. 
• On 17 October, the Super-Mie factory situated on the road 
from Jakarta to Bogor was blown up. The major noodle factories 
in Indonesia are owned by Lie Sioe Liong, who also holds the 
monopoly over the import and distribution of flour. There is 
little doubt that this target was selected because of its association 
with the Liem business conglomerate. 
• On 22 October, a large branch of the Sarinah department 
store company, situated in the southern suburb of Kebayoran, 
was gutted by fire, a day after the store had been warned that the 
building would be burnt down. The fire also destroyed an 
extension of the store that was to have been opened in 
December. The proprietor expressed amazement at the extent of 
the damage and could not understand how fail-safe , fireproof 
devices had failed to function. 
• On 23 October, police discovered a number of bombs on the 
premises of Jogjakarta's main railway station . 
• On 25 October, police in Surabaya, East Java, discovered a 
truckload of ammunition which the proprietor described as 
"scrap-iron". 
• On 29 October a luxury restaurant , a theatre and many shops 
were gutted in a fire that destroyed several storeys in Pasar 
Lindeteves, one of Jakarta's main shopping centres. Later that 
day, the most alarming incident of all occurred when the Marine 
Corps ammunition dump in the suburb of Cilandak literally blew 
up, after a fire broke out on the premises . The ammunition 
dump is situated in an area surrounded by Marine barracks and 
residential districts . Many houses were destroyed as shells and 
ammunition exploded, shooting out in all directions. Some of the 
shells landed several kilometres away, causing havoc in many 
Sarinah departmental store ablaze 
parts of Jakarta. Many thousands of families living near the 
dump fled with their belongings as the region covering a radius 
of several kilometres "resembled a battlefield" . 
The Cilandak incident renewed calls that had previously been 
made for such dangerous premises to be moved from built-up 
areas. Since the incident, families r.eturning to homes in ruins 
have complained bitterly about the lack of help from the 
government to rebuild their dwellings . According to official 
figures , at least 15 people were killed in the Cilandak incident. 
• On 1 November, a newly built departmental store on 
Malioboro , the main shopping thoroughfare in Jogjakarta was 
burnt down . On the same day, petrol bombs were discovered 
near the premises of a cinema in the city where a film on the 1965 
events was being shown. 
• On 11 November, the Kartika Plaza building, which houses 
one of Jakarta's most luxurious hotels as well as a number of 
company offices, went up in flames. The army is closely 
associated with the ownership of this building. 
• On 13 November, the central Sarinah departmental store in 
Jalan Thamrin, one of Jakarta's main thoroughfares, was burnt 
down. This was the first multi-storey departmental store to be 
built in Jakarta, constructed during the days of Sukarno. 
* * * 
No organisation has claimed responsibility for any of these 
attacks though it is not difficult to see that they are well-co-
ordinated. Nearly twenty people were arrested following the 4 
October bombing incidents; most are known to be members of 
the Gerakan Pemuda Kaba'ah (GPK), an organisation set up 
shortly before the 1982 elections to help mobilise young people 
in support of the Muslim party, the PPP. Though the GPK was 
never a PPP affiliate, it was oriented towards that party but has 
recently shifted away, especially since the party betrayed its 
Islamic principles, culminating in its decision in August to 
comply with the "Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle" demand of the 
government. 
Early comments on the 4 October incident described it as an 
act of reprisal by Muslims for the Tanjung Priok massacre . A far 
more likely explanation is that both the T1mjung Priok 
demonstration and all subsequent incidents reflect a rising level 
of anger among Muslims about a whole range of government 
policies, most notably the Societies Act which is now being 
pushed through Parliament, requiring all organisations to adopt 
the Pancasila as their only principle. 
There has been outspoken condemnation of government 
policy in a number of mosques. M. Nasir (not to be confused 
with Moh. Natsir, former leader of the Muslim party, Masyumi) 
said in a speech at the mosque in Tanjung Priok on 12 
September, the day of the massacre, that 19 mubaligs (lay 
preachers) had been summoned by the Deputy Governor of 
Jakarta to "account for" sermons they delivered during ldul Fitri 
which fell this year in June . In Tasikmalaya, West Java, the 
district head (bupati) has ordered mosques throughout the 
district to stop inviting mubaligs from outside Tasikmalaya, in an 
attempt to control the political content of preaching in the 
mosques. He is reported as having complained that "15 times in 
July and August alone, mubaligs 'infiltrated' and delivered 
'inflammatory' sermons". (Tempo, 10 November 1984.) 
There is no doubt that the government is also very alarmed at 
the amount of illegal literature and cassettes now circulating in 
many parts of the country. Cassettes of speeches made in 
Tanjung Priok in the days before the massacre are apparently 
particularly popular . 
Call for inquiry into Tanjung Priok Massacre 
2 
Four days after the Tanjung Priok massacre, a group of 
politicians and retired generals issued a White Paper 
challenging Murdani's account of the incident. The Paper 
described the incident as having been sparked off by 
offensive and provocative behaviour by the local military 
officer (koramil) who entered the mosque without taking 
off his shoes and smeared notices on the mosque wall with 
filthy drain water. 
The three concluding sections of the White Paper read 
as follows: 
Conclusions from this report 
People of the Muslim faith feel deeply offended by the 
desecration of their holy place of worship. There was no 
attempt by the authorities to resolve this problem 
properly. Members of the public not guilty of anything 
were arrested, detained and subjected to arbitrary 
treatment. The provisions of the Procedural Code were 
not heeded. A gathering of people was confronted by 
troops armed with automatic weapons, supported by 
armoured vehicles. The statement issued by the Armed 
Forces Commander-in-Chief is therefore at variance with 
the true facts. 
Cause and effect 
The above relates the events that led to the tragedy of 12 
September. But these events were simply the trigger which 
sparked off tensions that have for a very long time been 
rumbling below the surface of apparent stability. People 
like the late Moh Hatta (Vice-President 1945-1956) and 
the late Adam Malik (Vice-President 1978--1983) as well as 
many civilian and military personalities who are still living, 
have long since warned the authorities that many issues 
are causing public anxiety and creating unrest in social-
economic and political affairs. The cause of all this unrest 
goes back to one primary source: the government's 
violations of the contents and spirit of the 1945 
Constitution, reaching a climax with the Five Laws 
concerning the "regulation" of political life, in particular, 
the concept of "Pancasila-as-a-single-principle". More 
generally, those in power have deviated from the following 
broad principles: 
- belief in one God 
- civilised humanitarianism 
- unity of Indonesia 
- democracy guided by wisdom based on consultation 
and representation 
- social justice for the entire Indonesian people. 
People have no power to change things by democratic 
means. Thus, the Tanjung Priok incident is not an isolated 
event: it is a consequence of the present system. 
Proposal 
In the interests of justice for all, including the government, 
an independent commission should be set up to collect 
reliable information about the event in Tanjung Priok in 
September 1984. The report of this commission should be 
made public so that we can all draw lessons from this 
event. 
Among those signing the White Paper were politicians, 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former Finance Minister, and 
Burhanuddin Harapan, former Prime Minister, both of 
the Masyumi party, and H.M. Sam.~si, formerly of the 
Masyumi party and a minister in the 1966-68 cabinet; and 
retired Armed Forces Generals, Ali Sadikin (Marine 
Corps and former Governor of Jakarta), Hugeng (Police 
Chief till 1972) and Azis Saleh, H.R. Dharsono and 
Suyitno Sukitno (army). 
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New arrests 
Since the three bombing incidents on 4 October, the security 
forces have arrested a large number of people . The media in 
Indonesia have reported only the arrest of people said to be 
directly connected with the bombings , plus occasional arrests in 
connection with the distribution of illegal leaflets. 
The most important "bombing suspect" is Rachmat Basuki, a 
well known Muslim activist who was arrested in 1978 in 
connection with the so-called "20 March" affair. On that 
occasion, he was tried and sentenced to two years for trying to 
convince Islamic members of the upper legislative assembly 
(MPR) not to support the government's P4 (Pancasila 
indoctrination) plans which were to be ratified by the MPR. 
Basuki is also a member of the Gerakan Pemuda Kaba'ah. 
Several more detainees have been named, but others are said to 
have gone into hiding. The military authorities have been quoted 
as saying that some of this group will be brought for trial before 
the end of November. 
Well-known dissidents arrested 
But besides these reported arrests , a number of people 
connected with groups like the Petition-of-50 or well-known 
dissident figures have also been detained . These have not been 
reported in the Indonesian press, but information has 
nevertheless reached the outside world either through direct 
contact with people on the spot or, in one or two cases, from 
foreign press agency reports. They include: 
Tony Ardhie, a mubalig who was previously arrested and tried in 
1983 for a speech strongly attacking the government on the 
question of head-scarves . 
General Dharsono, a signatory of the White Paper and member 
of the Petition-of-50 group . For the first few years, Dharsono 
was chief-of-staff of the Siliwangi (West Java) Division , but 
came into conflict with Suharto over his "more radical" views on 
how to deal with the political parties. He later was given a 
civilian post as Secretary-General of ASEAN until his dismissal 
for supporting the Petition-of-50. 
A.M. Fatwa, secretary of dissident Ali Sadikin, former 
Governor of Jakarta and active in the Petition-of-50. Fatwa has 
been arrested a number of times for "inflammatory" sermons , 
and was once subjected to severe beating by military officers , 
which led him to sue the authorities. The litigation encountered 
difficulties; his team of lawyers were so badly intimidated that 
they were forced to abandon the case. 
Rhoma Irama, leader of the best known pop group in Indonesia, 
and originator of the dangdut music which became extremely 
popular a few years ago . Until the latest PPP congress, he 
supported that party . His group performed extensively during 
PPP rallies in the 1982 elections. 
Abdul Qadir Jaelani like Rachmat Basuki was previously 
arrested in 1978 in connection with the "20 March Movement" . 
On that occasion he was sentenced to 2112 years . He is chairman 
of the Indonesian Islamic Students Organisation (Persatuan 
Pe/ajar Islam Indonesia) . 
H. Mawardi Noor , a lawyer , and formerly chairman of the 
Indonesian Mubalig Corps. 
H.M. Sanusi , a leader of the reformist Muhamadiyah 
organisation and formerly leader of the Muslim party , Masyumi , 
now a member of the Petition-of-50 group. He was Minister for 
Textiles and Handicrafts in Suharto's first cabinet and a member 
of Parliament till 1977. 
Altogether 131 mubaligs arrested 
According to the Malaysian journal Panji Masyarakat , 
altogether 131 mubaligs have been arrrested since the Tanjung 
Priok Massacre . Apart from Tony Ardhie , Mawardi Noor, Abdul 
Qadir Jaelani and A.M. Fatwa, the journal also mentions the 
following names: Salim Kadar, H. Alwi Djamalulail, 
Machmudin Sudin, Suryani Tabar, Husin Umar, Moh. Nasir, 
Deliar Noor, Ir. Imanuddin, Endang Saefuddin and Anwar 
Haryono. 
Meanwhile, it now appears that the authorities are imposing a 
new regulation requiring mubaligs to have Mubalig Permits 
(Surat lzin Mubalig) before being allowed to deliver sermons in 
mosques. An ulama (religious scholar) named K.H. Sabal 
complained about this new regulation , describing it as "an 
obstacle", during a recent meeting between ulamas in Central 
Java and the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General 
Benny Murdani (Sinar Harapan, 12 September). 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (22 
November), two of those arrested, General Dharsono and Fatwa 
are accused of having attended meetings shortly after the 
Tanjung Priok incident at which discussions were held about 
retaliation for the massacre , though the Review suggests that 
these two are said to have "advised against rash destructive 
action" . 
Other members of the Petition-of-50 group are now under 
threat. Ali Sadikin was bitterly attacked in an editorial in the 
GOLKAR daily , Suara Karya, an attack which he will not be 
able to answer because his statements are banned from the 
media . 
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Societies Law 
Foreign Office conies to Indonesia's defence 
Lord A vebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, is involved in a lengthy correspondence with the Foreign Office 
about Indonesia's Societies Law. We publish below extracts from the correspondence which brings to light British Government efforts 
to protect the Indonesian Government from examination of its current plans to eliminate altogether freedom of organisation. 
A Straightforward Inquiry 
Lord Avebury's first letter to Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, asked what the British Government knew about the five 
new political Bills now before Parliament, particularly the 
Societies Bill which will impose new restrictions on social 
organisations. 
Sir Geoffrey Howe replied on 25 July: 
" .. . We of course follow developments in Indonesia with interest. But let 
me make quite clear that the subjects you raise are internal matters for 
Indonesia. It would not be right for me to comment on them ... " 
Lord A vebury Presses the Foreign Secretary 
Not satisfied with that reply, Lord Avebury pursued the matter 
in a letter dated 10 August: 
"In answer to questions in our House on religious persecution Janet 
Young said the other day that our diplomatic posts had standing 
instructions to report on these matters. 
It follows that you must have received word of the legislation I asked 
you about. I am not asking you to comment on it at this stage, though I 
notice that you are sometimes prepared to discuss human rights abuses. 
All I am asking is for you to let me know what are the terms of the 
legislation. I hope that with this clarification, you may be able to provide 
me with some information." 
Foreign Office quotes Suharto 
The Foreign Office reply, this time from Minister for Overseas 
Development, Timothy Raison, dated 5 September, read as 
follows: 
"Our Embassy in Jakarta has reported that the Indonesian authorities 
have not yet made available copies of the Bills but it appears from · our 
enquiries that most of the legislation under review is more a modification 
of existing Government powers than new policy. President Soeharto has 
gone out of his way to make clear that the measures are designed to 
promote national harmony. He also stated that "religious freedom is very 
firmly guaranteed by the Constitution" and "It is one of the most 
fundamental rights of man". 
Until the Bills are released I am afraid I am unable to provide you with 
information about their terms. The Bills have yet to pass through the 
Indonesian Parliament and may well be amended in the process." 
UK frigates for 
Indonesian Navy 
Three British Tribal-Class 81 frigates are at present being 
refitted at the Vosper Thomeycraft shipyards in Portsmouth for 
export to Indonesia. The refitting contract is worth £20 million. 
The frigates have a tonnage of 2,400 tons and are each 
equipped with two launchers for surface-to-air Seacat missiles. 
They will also carry Wasp helicopters, cannons to fire 4.5 inch 
rockets and 20 mm calibre guns. They have a maximum speed of 
25 knots, and carry a crew of 253 including 13 officers. The three 
frigates are HMS Zulu, HMS Tartar and HMS Gurkha, and 
have been in use in the Royal Navy since the 1960s. 
These three naval vessels will be the latest additions to the 
Indonesian Navy in their modernisation programme. In the past 
five years, the Navy has acquired four submarines from West 
Germany, three corvettes from Holland, eight high-speed patrol 
boats from South Korea, 12 patrol boats from Belgium and two 
patrol boats from West Germany. Indonesia is planning to build 
six more German patrol boats in its own shipyards. 
Lord A vebury astonished at Foreign Office lack of 
knowledge 
Lord Avebury's next reply, dated 14 September, read in part as 
follows: 
"Frankly, I was astonished by your statement that "our Embassy in 
Jakarta has reported that the Indonesian authorities have not yet m.ade 
available copies of" the draft legislation I asked about. I have smce 
discovered that not only were the five Bills in question introduced in the 
Indonesian Parliament in August, but their existence and contents were 
public knowledge even before this. In addition, the full text of the Bills has 
been published in the Indonesian press. They have been discussed and 
debated widely at all levels of Indonesian society. If your Embassy staff 
are doing their job properly, I find it incredible that they would have no 
information on the terms of this legislation. 
This apparent lack of knowledge is all the more troubling when one 
considers the importance of this legislation. You say that the Bills are seen 
as "more a modification of existing government powers than new policy". 
However, this view is not shared by Mr Mulya Lubis, the respected 
Director of the Legal Aid Institute, who was recently quoted as saying 
(Sinar Harapan, September 3) that the draft "Societies Law", one of the 
five Bills, is causing deep anxiety among organisations, which regard its 
provisions as a threat to their existence. They are particularly worried, he 
said, about clauses providing for the control, suspension and dissolution 
of organisations. Nor is your view shared, apparently, by The Times 
correspondent in Jakarta, who wrote on Wednesday about opposition to 
the proposals. He mentioned "strong, domestically respected voices" 
which have been raised against the Bills . . . 
In the light of the above, would you like to reconsider the view you 
expressed that the draft legislation is nothing more than a modification of 
existing laws?" 
Foreign Office: "Critical groups ... should not be over-
estimated" 
The next Foreign Office reply, signed this time by Minister of 
State Malcolm Rifkind, dated 8 October, read in part as follows: 
" ... The main substance of the drafts was, of course, as you say, widely 
known and discussed in the press. Our Embassy was well aware of this but 
we had not thought it proper, as we told you, to comment on the terms of 
the legislation until the Bills had gone through all the necessary steps of 
parliamentary consideration and possible amendment . . . 
As to their content and their implications in human rights terms, there 
General Sir Edwin Bramall, Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, 
visited Indonesia in November. He is seen here with General 
Benny Murdani and the British ambassador, Alan E. Donald. 
Sinar Harapan, I November 1984. 
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seems no reason to change the view we expressed earlier that the legislation 
qppears to be no more than a modification of existing government powers 
and a re-statement of well established policies. There has indeed, as you 
suggest, been some criticism of the legislation by local groups in 
Indonesia. But the weight and influence of these groups should not be 
over-estimated~ .. " 
Lord A vebury takes issue with the Foreign Office 
Lord Avebury's reply, dated 26 October, read in part as follows: 
" .. . In his original response, Geoffrey Howe said flatly that he could not 
comment on the matters I had raised . .. 
Tim Raison's reply to my second letter contained the inexplicable 
statement that "the Indonesian authorities have not yet made available 
copies of the Bills", this a full three months after the full text of the Bills 
had been published in a major Jakarta newspaper ... 
Finally, I discovered in your latest letter that our Embassy in Jakarta 
had known about the Bills all along . . . This news at least allays my fears 
about the competence of our Embassy, but it begs the question of why 
Geoffrey Howe's reply to my original letter did not include a similar 
statement, an inclusion which would have saved time and paper for both 
the Foreign Office and myself. 
.. . Having carefully studied the Bills and their reception in Indonesia, I 
must disagree with your positions on these issues. 
First of all, our government's principal source of information about this 
legislation appears to be the Indonesian authorities. I am not at all 
surprised that President Suharto, who is quoted in Tim Raison's letter . .. 
would speak favourably about legislation that they themselves have 
proposed. You dismiss those who have spoken out against the Bills, saying 
that "the weight and influence of these groups should not be 
overestimated". I refer you again to an article which appeared in The 
Times on September 12, calling attention to "strong, domestically 
respected voices" being raised against the proposals, including those of the 
late Vice-President Adam Malik; the former Asean Secretary-General, 
General Dharsono; seniors in the Roman Catholic Church; Muslim 
political party members; a former Army chief of staff; and several former 
Cabinet members. These people and others formed the so-called "Petition 
of 50 Group" which in August produced a pamphlet warning. legislators 
that the new laws were intended to institutionalise a military dictatorship. 
The Secretary of the Group is now in detention and others have been 
arrested . . . Jn a repressive society, people who are critical of the 
government are by definition in a position where they will have little 
A cartoonist's view 
"weight and influence". Where there is press censors~ip, a se.verely 
restricted party system, and indefinite detention without tnal, the voices of 
those who speak out for freedom and human rights will often seem. ~uted 
and weak. . . Whatever one thinks about the nature of the opposition to 
the draft legislation, the fact remains that a number of P_ron:inent 
Indonesians have criticised it. Why should they oppose these Bills if they 
are, as you claim, simply "a restatement of well-established p~li~ies? 
Two of the five laws can be considered as amendments to ex1stmg laws, 
another increases the number of seats in the Parliament, and a fourth 
stipulates that the Constitution may only be amended by referendum. The 
net effect of these four Bills would be to further tighten governm_en~ control 
over political life and to decrease the likelihood of the Constttutzon ever 
being amended. While they do not represent a new departure fo_r . the 
Indonesian regime, it is understandable that these Bills would be crltlctsed 
by those who oppose the Suharto government and support independent 
political parties. . 
The Bill which has aroused the most opposition, however, is the so-
called "Societies Law", which introduces a whole new range of restrictions 
on all social organisations. This proposed Bill is not merely "a 
modification of existing government powers". There.has previously be~n 
no law covering social organisations as a whole. This law would require 
all such organisations to adopt Pancasila, the official g?vernment 
ideology, as their only principle. It requires the gov~rnment to d~solve any 
organisation that "adheres to, advocates and dissemmat~s ideas and 
teachings that are in conflict with Pancasila and with the 1945 
Constitution, in all their forms and manifestations". The government is 
also given the power to suspend the executive of an organisation "if it 
engages in activities that disturb security and public order, or receives 
assistance from foreign sources without government approval". In other 
words, this law would give the government complete control ov~r all 
groups that are "set up voluntarily by Indonesian citizens to er:gage m co-
operative activity". This includes religious-based organisations, which 
have so far been the most outspoken against the Bill. 
Based on the information I have provided in this letter, is the Foreign 
Office now prepared to reconsider its position that this legislation i.s 
uni(rzportant and the opposition to it insignificant? I would be grateful if 
you would comment on the points I have raised." 
* * * 
At the time of going to press, Lord Avebury had not yet 
received a reply to this letter from the Foreign Office. 
"Just a load of scrap-iron, Sir . " 
"Beware of the extreme left and extreme right!" 
"What about the extreme centre?" 
• 
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"Very popular these days, aren't you?" 
From: Sinar Harapan Minggu 
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Guest column 
The provocation and victimisation 
of Muslim,s by Jusfiq Hadjar 
People who read about the growing hostility of Indonesian 
Muslims towards the Suharto government may be thinking that a 
situation is developing that is comparable with Iran before the 
fall of the Shah. Although there are gounds to compare Suharto 
with the Shah, there are at present no grounds for believing that 
a figure like Khomeini is likely to emerge in Indonesia . No one 
in Indonesia could possibly claim to become a Khomeini figure. 
This is first and foremost because Islam in Indonesia is sunni, not 
shi-ite, and it is therefore unthinkable for an imam to emerge 
who could claim to speak for the whole archipelago. Also the 
very concept of Islam becoming an undivided political power in 
Indonesia is not applicable because Islam in Indonesia is 
pluralistic, and this pluralism is reflected in the attitudes of 
Indonesian Muslims towards the goverment of General Suharto. 
A large number of devout Muslims in Indonesia collaborate 
with the military dictatorship. Idham Chalid, the well-known, 
older-generation opportunist and chairman of Nadhlatul Ulama, 
the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, and others who are 
on the central council of the PPP (the officially-sanctioned 
Islamic party) are not the only ones to stand squarely behind 
Suharto . Other, more critical leaders of the younger generation 
are now showing no opposition to the regime. Abdurrachman 
Wahid, the most critical of this generation who many of us hoped 
a year or so ago would be dedicated to an Islamnic revivalist 
movement , has recently thrown his support enthusiastically 
behind the repressive ideology of the regime. 1 
There are some devout Muslims who are critical of the regime 
though his does not mean that they are anti-western. One of the 
most influential people in this category is Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara , chairman of the Indonesian Mubalig2 Corps; he 
was once president of the Java Bank (the state bank under Dutch 
colonialism) and a Minister of Finance under the Republic, and 
is certainly one of the few real democrats of his generation. The 
pluralistic character of Islam in Indonesia is one of the reasons 
that Suharto has never been particularly threatened by Islam. If 
all Muslims stood behind a policy of hostility towards General 
Suharto, his government would never dare to hold general 
elections . 
But much blood flowed in Tanjung Priok, and hostility 
certainly exists. We need to look at the facts so as to determine 
where these feelings lie. The event which led directly to the 
outburst in Tanjung Priok was the initiative taken by the 
government to present five bills to Parliament (see TAPOL 
Bulletins Nos. 64 and 65, July and September 1984). This 
package of bills will have the effect of scrapping the last 
remaining vestiges of freedom of organisation and freedom of 
thought. A considerable number of politicians and social leaders 
have expressed outrage at these bills. Among them are the 
Petition-of-SO (50 prominent political figures of the old and new 
generation who signed the well-known petition in 1980), the 
League for Awareness of the Constitution (whose leaders 
include retired General Nasution) and four student 
organisations, HMI and PMII (both Muslim), the PMKRI 
(Catholic) and the GMKI (Protestant). 
The joint council of the five officially-sanctioned religions has 
also expressed opposition to the Bills, in particular the obligation 
for all parties and organisations to accept the Pancasila as their 
sole principle, the so-called azas tunggal Pancasila. But the 
Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) and the Bishops' 
Conference (MA WI) have since withdrawn their opposition. 
The Indonesian churches have never been conspicuous in their 
defence of individual freedoms and human rights. They have all 
Scapegoat 
From: Berita Tanpa 'Sensor, No.5, 1984. 
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too frequently and all too quickly given up any opposition to 
repressive regulations . 
On 17 August, a joint declaration was secretly published by a 
group of five organisations , among them a number of retired 
Armed Forces officers; the publication included three articles 
written by Mohamad Natsir, a former Prime Minister, Sanusi 
Hardjadinata , a former Minister of the Interior , and General 
Nasution .3 The broad spread represented by this publication 
indicates that opposition to the Suharto government is not 
confined to the Muslims . 
The Indonesian Mubalig Corps of which the Rawa Badak 
mosque in Tanjung Priok is a member, is also opposed to the five 
bills, in particular the Pancasila-as-a-sole principle obligation . 
The Corps defends the right of any organisation to preserve its 
own ideology and is doing all it can to oppose the laws. There is 
however little that can be done to prevent the bills from 
becoming law; they are almost certain to be approved by the 
rubber-stamp chamber that passes for a parliament in Indonesia. 
Like anyone else in Indonesia who thinks differently from the 
government , the Corps is denied access to the media. It is trying 
nevertheless to spread its views in Friday-service sermons, and 
by means of discussions . held among its own supporters and 
within the geographical confines of mosques sympathetic to its 
ideas. Some of these mosques have also stuck up notices about 
meetings on their walls. 
It is worth noting that in their campaign for such a 
fundamental right, they are keeping to the limits of democratic 
fair-play, concerning themselves with the stifling effects of the 
regime's laws and presidential edicts. But in the eyes of the 
government, their campaign has gone too far. Their discussions, 
Threats by phone have added to the general sense of insecurity. 
Though several Sarinah employees said that warnings were 
received by phone before the Jalan Thamrin store was burnt 
down, Murdani still says that the fire ~as "probably an 
accident". Any other explanation would only reinforce the feeling 
that the security forces have lost control. 
like discussions held by other groups, have been spied on by 
secret service informants equipped with walkie-talkies . Thi! wall-
notices in the Rawa Badak mosque were removed by police 
agents, an act which even Indonesian law prohibits. Not only did 
they tear up these notices or smear them with black paint, they 
also entered the holy sanctuaries of Muslims wearing their 
jackboots , whereas people should enter such places only with 
bare feet. It is quite understandable (not to say justifiable) for 
crowds at the Rawa Baddak to have then gone to the length of 
burning this man 's motorbike. It is not correct to say therefore 
that the events in Tanjung Priok were evidence of hostility 
towards the regime by devout Muslims. They were simply a 
response to the everyday practices of the military dictatorship. 
Or to be more exact, this was again a case of provocation by the 
government on the eve of discussions of a very sensitive subject 
in Parliament, intended to intimidate any members of 
Parliament who might want to express views not in line with 
those of the government . This was the objective too of previous 
secret-service provocations-the Komando Jihad (Holy War 
Command) in 1978, and the hijacking of a Garuda plane to 
Bangkok in 1981. In 1984 it is Rawa Badak. In all thse incidents, 
the Muslims have been the scapegoats and at the same time the 
victims. 
Footnotes 
1 Abdurrachman Wahid was recently named as one of the 113 so-called 
manggalas . the top-level , officially-certified ideologues and tutors of the 
Pancasila. 
2mubalig: lay preacher. 
JThis document entitled Save Democracy is summarised in TAPOL 
Bulletin No . 65 . September 1984. 
Commander-in-Chief Benny Murdani has 
summoned thousands of u/amas to meetings 
held in West Java, Central Java and East 
Java in the past few weeks, to tell them that 
the government expects them to drive 
"irresponsible elements" out of the 
mosques. The gist of his speeches has been 
that Muslims must themselves do the work 
of the security forces. "It's better for you to 
tell (these irresponsible elements) to get out 
than to wait for the Military Commander to 
bring along ten truckloads of troops to 
arrest one person." (Sinar Harapan, 12 
November). Murdani spoke to 4,000 
u/amas in Central Java, 2,000 in West Java 
and a similar number in East Java. 
From: Tempo, 17 November, 1984. 
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West Papua 
Repatriation plans totally rejected 
by refugees 
West Papuan refugees in the refugee camp at Black Water 
Creek, near Vanimo in the north-west of Papua New Guinea 
greeted Indonesian officials with a hail of stones and abuse when 
they tried to enter the camp earlier this month. The 
demonstration involving virtually all the refugees in the camp 
held high banners condemning Indonesia's occupation of their 
country and calling on the UN to support their demand for 
independence . 
The Indonesian officials were members of a "verification 
team" led by Brigadier-General Sugiyono, Vice-Governor of 
Irian Jaya (West Papua) which was planning to visit all the 
refugee camps in PNG in preparation for a repatriation 
programme already agreed upon by the Indonesian and PNG 
governments . 
Already two weeks before the visit took place, refugees at 
Black Water made it clear that they did not want to have 
anything to do with the team of Indonesians, and warned that 
they would be risking their lives if they attempted to visit the 
camp. (Niugini News, 18 September 1984) . About a month ago, 
the refugees refused to receive a group of Catholic and 
Brigadier-General Sugi-
yono, Deputy Governor 
of Irian Jaya, after being 
attacked in Vanimo 
From: Sinar Harapan, 
5 November , 1984. 
KEO NG 
Protestant churchmen because they do not trust the motives of 
any Indonesians attempting to make contact with them . Earlier 
this year, a joun:alist from the Jakarta weekly, Tempo was 
forced to leave the same camp in a hurry after the refugees 
organised a demonstration complete with OPM flag and 
banners, and chased the journalist out of the camp (see TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 63 , July 1984). 
The latest and most powerful demonstration has put an end to 
Indonesian efforts to organise the repatriation of more than 
10,000 West Papuan refugees who have fled to PNG since 
February this year. After months of haggling between Indonesia 
and the PNG, during the course of which the PNG government 
seemed to think that it could persuade the refugees to return 
home provided Indonesia gave written guarantees about the 
refugees ' safety, it is the refugees themselves who have put an 
end to the repatriation plans . Immediately after the incident at 
Black Water, Brigadier-General Sugiyono announced that the 
team were returning home immediately and the remaining 
programme of camp visits was being abandoned. 
Black Water was the third camp on the team's itinerary. The 
first camp they visited was Kwek, where 881 refugees are 
thought to be living , but when the team arrived at the camp, they 
found it completely deserted. At Green River camp, which holds 
about 275 refugees, the team was welcomed by demonstrators 
carrying a large number of banners supporting the OPM. The 
Indonesian officials asked the PNG security forces to have the 
banners removed but the refugees refused to comply. Some of 
the slogans on the banners have been reproduced in the 
Indonesian press: "We categorically reject the PNG-Indonesian 
N4MA SAYA 
RAOENMAS SASAR. 
PAMSUD/ MLILYO~G"MS'O 
,,, B/AR DIHINA 
DI FORUM INTERNASIONAL 1 SABAR ,,, 
111DIKEvAR-KEvAR KAYAK 
MAilNG PASA~ 
'" TETAP SABllARR ,,, ,. M-J rg /J(/g,,, , 
_____ _,, 
~ 
f~~Nl'l11 
"I'm . ~ade~ Mas ~ambudi Mulyopangarso; my middle name is Patience. 
Humiliat:;d mternationally, chased like a market thief, yet I'm always patient ••• 
He-he... From: Sinar Harapan , 5 November, 1984. 
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prngramme for repatriation", "UN should help our people who 
want independence for West Papua" , "Indonesia must end its 
colonisation of Papuan soil and restore our human rights" and 
"The West Papuan refugees are not the affair of Indonesia". 
Repatriation efforts abandoned 
Obviously humiliated by this well-publicised rebuff by West 
Papuans now in PNG, the Indonesian government appears to be 
accepting the fact that their plans for repatriation will have to be 
scrapped . Tempo (17 November) reports that Indonesia seems 
inclined to let the refugees themselves decide whether they want 
to return , and leave them to return home on foot. 
Attention now seems to be turning to reports that OPM units 
near the border with PNG are receiving supplies of new weapons 
from abroad. Tempo reports one claim that planes dropping food 
supplies to refugees in camps in the Vanimo region have been 
dropping cases containing weapons as well. One opposition PNG 
politician , Mr Okok had compared the present developments as 
being similar to the situation that preceded Indonesia 's invasion 
of East Timor at the end of 1975. 
Vanimo refugees arrested by the PNG authorities 
According to Indonesian press reports, the PNG authorities 
have arrested nine of the refugees who are thought to have been 
responsible for organising the demonstration at Black Water 
camp and intend to put them on trial. A tenth is apparently going 
to be expelled from the country. The ten refugees are: Tom 
Ireeuw, a Cendrawasih University lecturer , Jimmy Wawar, a 
civil servant, Michael Kareth, a student , Eliza Awom and John 
Jamboani , army deserters , Yance Hambring, OPM leader from 
Genyem, Costan Ruhukail , civil servant, Demi Kurni , civil 
servant , Dominggus Mesas , community leader from the region 
of Arso and Mrs Corry Ap, the wife of the murdered museum 
curator, Arnold Ap. 1 
Efforts to pass sentences against the refugees are bound to 
arouse a great deal of public condemnation in PNG where , 
according to Tempo , there are growing demands for the 
government to allow all refugees who refuse to return to 
Indonesia to stay in the country. The Catholic bishops in the two 
border provinces, Bishop Gerard Deschamps of Daru (Western 
Province) and Bishop John Etheridge of Vanimo (West Sepik 
Province) , have both publicly voiced this demand. 
1 An Indonesian official has since complained bitterly (Sinar Harapan, 17 
November) that only one of these "ring-leaders"-Costan Ruhukail-is 
among the nine people now being tried in PNG. 
Profiteering from forced Asmati 
labour 
The following extracts on the exploitation of Asmat people by 
timber concession companies are from a report by Max 
J . Wajong to the Seminar on Development in Irian Java held in 
Jakarta from 30 April-2 May this year. The report, entitled 
"Limiting the Damaging Effects of Development on the Social 
Values of the Asmat People" , shows that exploitation of the 
Asmat tribespeople in the interests of timber-racketeering 
described at length two years ago (see TAPOL Bulletin No . 52 , 
1982) is still very much in progress. 
* * * 
Can't timber concession licences in the Asmat region be 
temporarily suspended? 
While not intending to revive all the commotion of the past few 
years regarding the negative features (of timber logging) which, 
up to a point, received some attention .. . I nevertheless think it 
necessary on this occasion to raise the issue .. . Let us start by 
studying some data which I obtained from people who hold 
timber concessions in Asmat: 
A timber-concession holder operating in the Asmat region 
with an area of 785 hectares for 1982/83 incurred the following 
production costs per cubic metre of timber: 
Export tax 
IHH* 
IHHT 
Grading fee 
MPO export 
S.PS .W 
Stevedoring 
Reforestation 
Bank Commission 
Production ie. labour costs 
Other costs 
Total 
Production costs for 4,000 cubic metres at 
Rp.31,836 per cubic metre: 
Export earnings at a price of Rp.970 
per cubic metre 
Profit 
Rp. 7,760 
Rp . 2,100 
Rp. 140 
Rp. 250 
Rp. 1,280 
Rp. 2,000 
Rp. 1,000 
Rp. 3,880 
Rp. 101.35 
Rp. 10,575 
Rp. 2,750 
Rp . 31,836.35 
Rp.127 ,345.400 
Rp .174,600.000 
Rp. 47 ,254.600 
•we have not attempted to identify the abbreviations . 
The Asmat tribesman who has been forced to go into the 
forest to cut down timber actually receives only Rp .4,500 of the 
Rp.10 ,575 paid out as production (labour) costs, plus an 
additional Rp .1,500 for waiting until the timber can be loaded on 
board ship for export. The remainder of his earning is shared out 
between officials: 60% for the sub-district chief (camat) 20% for 
the police, and 20% for the sub-district army officer (koramil) . 
We can well ask whether such a wage is reasonable for the 
Asmat man who is required to work so hard . To give an idea of 
what is involved, during a period of logging which lasts anything 
from one to two months, all the adult men in a kampung have to 
go into the forest to cut down timber , during which time each 
man will produce 5 to 10 cubic metres of timber, depending on 
circumstances and how hard he works . He thus earns anything 
between Rp .25 ,000 and Rp.50,000. But before being paid he 
must wait till the timber is loaded on board , and even then , it will 
take some time before payment is made bearing in mind the lack 
of communications. Then, when payment is made , money will 
first be deducted for "contact" goods such as packed tobacco, 
distributed to the men as an incentive before they went logging. 
Nor can the Asmat people check the way their timber is 
measured, which is done by the concession-holder. 
Then, when payment is made, the local shops, all run by 
outsiders (ie . Indonesians) will do brisk business by marking up 
their prices . In a single day, one of these shops can easily make a 
net profit of one to two million rupiahs . As for the Asmat 
people , they pay whatever price is marked because they have 
money in their hand and feel pleased that they can buy 
something. The little money they receive is therefore almost 
certain to be spent in a single day . While the men have been 
away cutting timber , their kampung has been left empty, the 
houses uncared for, bushes untended, the children left without 
sustenance and gardens untilled. So what is the value of the 
money they earn compared with these negative factors , whilst 
others profit from the ignorance of the Asmat people about 
timber logging or the wage they ought to be paid because they 
have no experience of a market economy? 
And how much, we should ask, of the foreign exchange 
earnings and taxes amounting to more than Rp.20,000 per cubic 
metre goes back to the Asmat region? What do they get in the 
form of education , health services, teachers , doctors co-
operatives, communications facilities and so on! ' 
In view of all this, is.it not time to postpone for the time being 
these timber concessions? . . . 
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Planned relocation of the 
Papuan population 
The Army's "Special Territorial Management"* for Irian Jaya 
In the last issue of TAPOL Bulletin, we published a diagram of a plan to re-locate the Papuan population of lrian Jaya, which w~ 
attached to a document issued in April this year by Brigadier-General Melia/a Sembiring, military commander of the 17th/Centrawasth 
Divisional Command, and promised to give a detailed account of the plan. Since then, the plan has been described in an article by Br~g­
General Sembiring, dated 19 October 1984, published in Kompas in October. The article, being more succinct than the earlter 
voluminous document, is used in the following . 
We summarise Sembiring's plan because it envisages a comprehensive upheaval of West Papuans in the interests of Indonesia's 
security objectives. His "smiling", anthropological approach is a cover for direct and invariably brutal military intervention in all 
aspects of people's lives. His plan to create controlled population settlements is also evidence that the army's efforts so far to annihilate 
the OPM have got nowhere. 
Sembiring starts by stressing that the region and society in Irian 
Jaya is "completely different" from the rest of Indonesia . Its 
special features are: 
" . .. full of dense jungle, high mountains and marshes, a great 
diversity of tribes , each with their own distinct customs, (a region) 
sharing a border with a foreign state whose people are of the same 
race as the people of Irian Jaya, and, most important of all, the 
continued existence of the GPK" ("security disruptor gangs", the 
army's designation for the OPM, the Free Papua Movement) . 
To cope with these special conditions, the 17th/Cendrawasih 
Division has, since mid-1982 implemented a special type of 
territorial management in Irian Jaya because the "wrong 
approach" could 0"obstruct the development process and disrupt 
regional stability" . The "right approach" involves "socio-
anthropological, socio-religious and socio-psychological 
approaches" . 
Centres for Social Development 
The section of Sembiring's article on the relocation of the 
population is worth quoting in full: 
"The basic strategy for restoring security in lrian Jaya is concentrated 
on separating the people from GPK, inculcating a spirit of non-co-
operation/resistance among the people towards the GPK, localising 
the security-disruptors, striking out at those disruptors who persist, 
and consolidating and rehabilitating the region . 
"The smiling policy implemented by the 17th/Cendrawasih 
Division before the middle of 1982 was the first step in our efforts to 
detach the people from the influences of the GPK separatist idea, and 
this policy must be further developed by means of more basic 
management . Territorial smiling reflects a territorial attitude guided 
by the eight duties of the Armed Forces. Territorial smiling means 
acting with human feelings and outlooks, honest openness and 
friendship from the (army) apparatus towards the people in its area. 
This can in practice be done by face-to-face encounters, house-visits, 
especially in the more remote regions, and other such family 
activities . 
"The next step which is now needed is to separate the people from 
the GPK, mentaUy and physically, by setting up Centres for Social 
Development (Pusat Pengembangan Masyarakat) or PPMs, that is to 
say, setting up settlement locations especially in the more remote 
regions, taking account of local customs, religious beliefs, life-styles, 
historical background, inter-tribal relations, and the aspirations of the 
local community. A programme to raise living standards and improve 
social and economic conditions is a powerful magnet to attract the 
people in the vicinity to settle in the PPM locations so as to detach them 
from the influences of the GPK separatists." 
Forming opinion and creating a national identity 
Sembiring then sets out to explain the need for a vastly expanded 
programme of Pancasila indoctrination (P4) "to cultivate 
national pride, self-respect and broaden people's horizons so as 
to create a conciousness of being (part of) a nation, part of the 
Indonesian state, and to defend the state". The trouble is, he 
admits, that the Pancasila ideology has not yet taken root 
because of "the simplistic way of thinking of the population". 
The number of people being subjected to P4 indoctrination is far 
from adequate to keep pace with the growth of the population, 
so the territorial apparatus (ie. the army) must "socialise" the 
Pancasila, simplify it in terms familiar to the people. The army 
must employ the "tutor system" so as to penetrate more 
effectively; once they can function as "leaders and guides" they 
will be able to follow through with "territorial management". 
Turning to the lack of skills among Papuan youth, which 
results in widespread unemployment, Sembiring stresses the 
need for vocational training to be provided through the PPMs, 
with projects organised by World Vision International and the 
Department of Social Affairs . 
"Cultivating a national identity in society will certainly make 
society resilient, ideologically, politically, economically, soCially 
and culturally and in defence . . . (all of which is) the basis for 
people's resistance to the separatists." Sembiring claims that this 
special "territorial management" has already helped to isolate 
the GPK, forcing some of them to surrender, though others are 
still persisting. He claims that since 1982 [when, it should be 
noted, the army was claiming that the OPM was already a "spent 
force"], 593 OPM fighters have surrendered or been captured, 
together with 5,886 supporters. 
After giving the names of OPM members of leaders who are 
now active along the border or in refugee camps in Papua New 
Guinea, Sembiring claims that the OPM president, Efraim 
James Nyaro has twice, through the intermediary of the Bishop 
of Vanimo, John Holdridge (sic) , offered to hold negotiations-
" but we were forced to reject this because it implied recognising 
him as 'president'". However, Sembiring concludes, somewhat 
optimistically in view of the recent experiences of Indonesia's 
"verification team" at refugee camps in PNG, "we shall 
generously and open-heartedly welcome back the border 
crossers as Indonesian citizens if they consciously return to the 
fold of the Motherland". 
*"Te~ritori~I ?.1anage~;nt" (p_embinaan territorial/wilayah) is part of the 
ar~y s basic . de!ence doctnne call~d f!erang wilayah dan pembinaan 
wt/ayah (terntonal warfare and terntonal management) which asserts 
that the typ~ of ~arfare the Indonesian army must prepare for is guerrilla 
warfare agamst internal or external enemies. Hence the need for the 
army, at all times, to organise "total people's defence" (hankamrata) by 
means of its "management" of society right down to the lowest units. 
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West Papua 
PNG visitor discusses the refugee question 
The following interview of Mr Gregory Mongi of Papua New Guinea took place in London, shortly after he briefly visited some refugee 
camps near the PNG border with the Indonesian province of lrian Jaya (West Papua) . Mr Mongi gave the interview in his personal 
capacity as a private citizen of PNG and was not speaking on behalf of any organisation. 
Please explain developments surrounding the refugee question 
over the past few years. 
I will go back to 1981 when I first came into personal contact 
with refugees. In that year, 11 political refugees set off for PNG 
but only 10 arrived; the eleventh was shot and killed by the 
Indonesian military as they were escaping across the border. 
Most were Cendrawasih University students . They were taken to 
Vanimo by the authorities and questioned . I believe an attempt 
was made to send them back to Jayapura but it didn't work. 
They feared for their lives . 
Why did they decide to leave? Does PNG collaborate with 
Indonesia to repatriate refugees from West Papua? 
That was a time of tensions in Jayapura and many groups 
supporting independence had begun to get organised. These 11 
men must have been under close surveillance, so they decided to 
run away . 
As for your second question: No, that is not the practice. I 
personally am not aware of any political refugees being 
repatriated. They normally receive help from the UN High 
Commission for Refugees for asylum in a third country, and get 
permissive residence to stay in PNG until asylum is found. 
The next group to arrive and contact me was Seth Rumkorem 
and nine others. Seth Rumkorem and two others have been 
offered asylum in Greece but the rest are still waiting for a 
country to accept them. Then in 1983, a group of 32 refugees 
'Yalked across the border undetected by our border authorities. 
Later they were taken to Vanimo for questioning; they were 
tried and convicted for illegal entry. Public opinion was against 
this verdict and favoured a more compassionate response by the 
PNG government because they are our Melanesian brothers and 
sisters. In June 1983, I went to Vanimo to visit them in jail but 
the authorities refused to allow me access. 
The really huge wave of refugees began this year-300 in 
February but by July the figure had risen to 10,000, most of them 
women and children. These mass crossings followed in the wake 
of the flag-raising ceremony in Jayapura after which the 
Indonesian military began a crack-down against anyone 
suspected of "subversive" activity. My own figure-checked and 
re-checked-was 10,110. But sometimes, people slip back and 
forth across the border to collect food from their gardens, then 
return to PNG. 
So, some people occasionally return home? What else is this for 
besides tending their gardens? 
I should explain that many of those who have come across do 
not under the concept of refugee that you have in the West. The 
most educated Papuans can and do express love for their 
motherland. But the simple villager is more concerned with his/ 
her garden, land, fruit-trees, livestock and few basic possessions . 
Even the simple digging-stick is very important to them. All 
these possessions constitute life to us Melanesians. Therefore I 
can easily sympathise with my displaced brothers or sisters when 
they decide to go for a walk which, I know, is more than just a 
walk . They want to be back with everything that makes them 
complete human beings even though it means taking risks on the 
way. 
People I met at the camps expressed a firm longing to return 
to their beloved homeland as soon as the tensions die down, on 
condition, that is, that their lives are safeguarded. I was told 
about an elderly person who chose to stay at home, preferring to 
die on his ancestral land than flee to safety in PNG. I heard that 
he is still alive, happy to know that the women and children are 
safe in PNG. There are cases where whole hamlets have crossed 
over . 
What has caused the renewed influx of refugees in the past few 
months, with refugees coming over not just in the north but also 
in the south? 
You should realise that there is a great deal of fighting 
between the OPM and the Indonesian military , but the clashes 
are not always major armed confrontations. West Papuans have 
human feelings, and know what they like or what they won't 
accept. Whenever they express dissatisfaction, the army assaults 
innocent people . This means that dialogue is difficult. I do not 
accept Indonesia's claim that the people are being incited by the 
OPM to run away . From my own discussions with people at the 
border camps , I conclude that there is a lot of fighting going on . 
People can provide precise information, with date and place. But 
the fighting in West Papua cannot be compared with Africa or 
Central America . There are no large-scale military operations , 
but people are disappearing or being killed all the time . 
I admire the way Indonesia claims to be a country with rich 
cultural diversity, yet united . But, why use military force if the 
cultures live in such harmony? The military serve only to prolong 
the resistance and the hatred people feel for the Jakarta 
OPM fighters armed with rifles and spears. 
From: Tempo, 17 November, 1984. 
government. I have good friends in Indonesia, and to generalise 
that all Indonesians are bad would be false and unjust. But 
Jakarta's transmigration programme will eventually force a lot of 
Melanesians off their ancestral land , destroying the dignity of 
these people for ever, if care is not observed now. Land being 
taken for transmigration is not compensated for by the Jakarta 
authorities. Is that cultural harmony? 
If the OPM only has 250 people , as the Indonesians claim, 
how can such a small number incite over ten thousand tribal 
villagers and public servants to leave everything they most 
cherish and flee to PNG as refugees? They told me about the 
army burning down houses, destroying gardens and fruit trees, 
raping women, killing livestock , desecrating Christian symbols. I 
was told of a 15-year-old boy who was beheaded for drawing the 
West Papuan flag and scrawling his name in the sand. He was the 
son of one of the men who kidnapped the Swiss pilot earlier this 
year , so I was told . 
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We have heard a lot about the transmigration programme and 
Indonesian attempts to include Papuans as "trans-locals". Are 
you aware of any attempts by the Indonesians to concentrate bush 
people in resettlements like the strategic resettlements in East 
Timor? 
That's precisely what people are afraid of and what the 
Indonesians are doing-driving them off their traditional lands 
and telling them to live elsewhere . This cuts right across the 
Melanesian tradition. West Papuans object strongly to being 
forced off their land where their ancestors are buried, and being 
·~ ~ .!:·-"·_,}~:· •. 
. ..:: L 
Dani tribesmen planting rice instead of potatoes. t's all part of 
being absorbed into Indonesian society, say the authorities. 
From: Sinar Harapan , 28 October, 1984. 
told to live on land that doesn't belong to them but to a different 
clan . The Indonesians have no conception of the meaning of clan 
membership. 
How would you explain the PNG government's hesitation about 
letting the UNHCR get involved? Is it the result of Indonesian 
pressure? 
My impression is that there is apprehension that the UNHCR 
might be used to help Indonesia get rid of as many Papuans as 
possible so as to leave more space for the Javanese to settle. 
There's a feeling too that if the UNHCR , or more correctly, the 
UN as a whole wanted to get involved, they should go back to 
the beginning, to 1962 (when the New York Agreem~nt was 
signed between Indonesia and Holland, handing West Papua 
over to Indonesia) and to 1969 when the "Act of Free Choice" 
which Papuans call the "Act of No Choice" took place. That's 
the root of the problem, and as long as that isn't solved, people 
will go on spilling over into PNG. So, I think that allowing these 
people to settle in our territory or finding them places elsewhere 
isn't really helping the cause of the West Papuans. 
But at the same time, the PNG government takes the position 
that the refugee problem must be solved bilaterally with 
Indonesia, which means accepting the outcome of the Act of No 
Choice . Yet as for raising the issue at the UN (as distinct from 
the UNHCR), I think the PNG government feels that 
Indonesia's bargaining position is too strong. So the PNG faces a 
dilemma, a stalemate, not knowing how far it can trust the UN to 
solve the problem. But what we do want is for the government to 
deal with the UNHCR as a refugee agency. 
But there's a problem because the UNHCR only has a liaison 
office in Port Moresby, with only one official plus a legal officer. 
They really need someone with authority to help PNG withstand 
Indonesian pressures. When arguments take place between our 
government and Indonesia, it would be helpful to have a full-
blown UNHCR office. 
Fainine again hits the Balie1n Valley 
At least 200 people are known to have died of starvation in the 
region of Kurima, Jayawijaya , the district of West Papua located 
between Jayapura district in the north and Merauke province in 
the south. Kurima lies in the Baliem Valley and is the region that 
was severely hit by famine two years ago when it was reported 
that over a hundred people died of hunger. 
Sinar Harapan (8 November 1984) reports that the official 
death figure is 117 but according to its own independent sources 
(which are probably church missionaries in the region who are in 
contact with the Christian newspaper), the figure is actually 
nearly twice as much. Another 3, 173 people, mostly small 
children and the elderly, are said to be in a critical state. As in 
the previous instance of famine, the authorities complain that it 
is difficult to reach the people affected because they live in 
remote regions. 
But the district head, Albert Dien, gives a rather different 
explanation. He mentions on the one hand a pest called suklum, 
as large as a butterfly, which attacks tubers, making them 
inedible . The second cause reflects the disastrous impact on the 
people of being forced to adjust to a money economy with the 
result that they are deserting their gardens to find work which 
can earn a cash income. Many people, says Dien, sought work at 
a road-construction project under way nearby since April this 
year, but found that they were not able to buy marketed food in 
the area with the money they earned, whereas their own food 
producing activities had been abandoned for the project. Dien 
does not explain the circumstances in which the local people 
were "persuaded" to go and work on the project, nor does his 
explanation tally with the report that the people are too remote 
to be reached. 
The critical conditions described by Sinar Harapan, which 
warns that many more victims are likely to die because they are 
already far too weak to move, recalls comments made by people 
helping West Papuan refugees in PNG. Many of the refugees 
from central and southern regions of West Papua show signs of 
long-term food deficiencies and suffer from illnesses that should 
have been treated long ago, they say . 
Refugees in PNG. A PNG Red Cross report concluded that 90-
95% are "suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition", much 
of it from before leaving West Papua. (National Times, PNG, 30 
August, 1984.) 
Suharto told the Sultan of Brunei during his recent visit: 
"Indonesia won't be expansionist". 
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L East Timor I 
Moch tar: ''We'll only allow visits that are 
in our interests'' 
The Indonesian Foreign Minister has announced that , in 
addition to allowing persons from diplomatic missions to visit 
East Timor, it will also consider issuing permits to persons 
proposed by foreign embassies in Jakarta , "provided the 
Indonesian Government considers that the visit would be in 
Indonesia's interests" . The first mission to be allowed in on this 
basis was one last month led by Charles Morrash , Indonesia 
Diplomats from Jakarta visit a sugar plantation in East Timor. 
(Source: East Timor After Integration (1983), Jakarta.) 
Desk officer at the State Department in Washington. This 
m1ss1on , like the earlier Australian parliamentary and 
ambassadorial missions , is specifically described as not being a 
fact-finding mission but only a routine , orientation mission. 
In an interview with Newsweek recently, Foreign Minister 
Mochtar Kusumaatmaja said that none of the official missions 
which have visited East Timor recently have found anything to 
support the "propaganda" being spread by groups about 
conditions there . This is hardly surprising since he has himself 
made it clear that only visits serving Indonesia's interests will be 
permitted . 
Mochtar accuses US Congressmen of "not reading what 
they sign" 
Mochtar also said that it was an "open secret" that many 
members of the House of Representatives "sign things without 
knowing what they are signing" . Reporting this highly offensive 
remark , Sinar Harapan (26 October) said this was assumed to be 
a reference to a statement about East Tim or recently signed by 
213 (sic) members of the US Congress. 
Increased transmigration 
to East Timor 
Indonesian plans to carry out large-scale transmigration to East 
Timor in an attempt to overwhelm the local population and quell 
the resistance appear to be in progress. When the plans were 
announced earlier this year , no figures were given, but according 
to a report in Merdeka (23 August 1984) , 500 "model peasants" 
from Bali and Java are soon to be settled in .the south-western 
region of East Timor in the very near future . 
Two sites are being prepared , one in the village of Salele , 
near Tilomar (a few miles from the border with West Timor) and 
the other in the village of Beko, near the district capital of Suai. 
Each of the sites will be inhabited by 500 families, half of them 
from Bali and Central Java and the rest "translocals", that is to 
say East Timorese . 
The tactic of forcing the local inhabitants to live in Javanese/ 
Balinese communities follows the pattern being used in West 
Papua though in that region, the "translocal" mix is kept at 25% . 
A report in The Observer (23 September 1984) described the 
Indonesian plans as "swamp tactics" and asserted that the policy 
of transmigration had been denounced at the United Nations as 
"internal colonialism" . 
Morrison and Murdani: A 20-year friendship 
Australia's new ambassador to Indonesia is to be Bill Morrison 
who, it has recently been revealed, has a long-standing and very 
close friendship with General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-
Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. 
The two men first met in Bangkok in 1965 when Morrison was 
Third Secretary at the Australian Embassy and Murdani was in 
Bangkok on an intelligence mission for Suharto, under cover as a 
Garuda airways administrative employee, but in fact organising 
secret contacts with the Malaysian government to sabotage the 
Indonesian government's policy of confrontation with Malaysia. 
The Jakarta daily, Sinar Harapan (25 October 1984) reported 
that · after the two men became close friends in Bangkok, they 
were then both posted to Kuala Lumpur where their friendship 
continued to flourish. It was some time later , when Morrison 
held a diplomatic post in Singapore that he was "discovered" by 
Australian Labour Party leader, Gough Whitlam and persuaded 
to go into politics (The Australian , 24 October) . It was not long 
before he won a seat in Parliament for the ALP, and then 
became Minister of Defence in the Gough Whitlam government 
which gave Suharto the go-ahead for an all-out invasion of East 
Timor in late 1975. It could well be that Morrison's eligibility for 
high political office in a country where relations with Indonesia 
dominate foreign affairs, was based on his closeness with 
Murdani, then as now a key figure in Indonesian army 
intelligence. 
After the present Labour Government took office in 
Canberra last year, Morrison headed a parliamentary delegation 
to East Timor and produced a report very favourable to 
Indonesia . It was Morrison personally who ignored efforts by 
two Fretilin guerrillas who stopped his car on the way to Baucau 
to invite members of the delegation to meet resistance leaders 
and hear the views of the East Timorese people. 
Under the direction of an ambassador who is so close to the 
second most powerful man in Indonesia today, it is difficult to 
see how Australian policy 'towards Indonesia can do anything but 
serve Indonesia's interests. 
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Political prisoners .. 
Three co1n1nunist prisoners under threat 
of execution 
It has recently been announced that death sentences passed 
against three communist political prisoners have been upheld by 
the President; now that they have exhausted all avenues to have 
their sentences commuted, they could be executed at any time . 
All three men, Djoko Untung, Gatot Lestario (Sutaryo) and 
Mohamad Munir were arrested during or after the South Blitar 
(East Java) affair of 1968 when many PKlieaders who escaped 
arrest in 1965 went underground and attempted to organise 
resistance to the military government. Djoko Untung (63 years 
old), a member of the PKI (Communist Party) East Java 
provincial committee was arrested on 6 July 1968 in South Blitar; 
Gatot Lestario (59 years old), chairman of the PKI East Java 
provincial committee was arrested on 19 January 1969 in Jakarta 
or East Java; and Moh . Munir (59 years old), chairman of the 
National Council of the all-Indonesia trade union federation , 
SOBS!, was arrested in August 1968. 
The announcement that Djoko Untung's and Ga tot Lestario's 
clemency pleas had failed came in a press report (Suara Karya, 
11 October 1984). A spokesman of the East Java Public 
Prosecutor's office said that senior military and police officers in 
East Java were discussing the date of the execution, which could 
take place "soon". The spokesman told the press that Djoko 
Untung's clemency plea was rejected on 31 October 1983 and 
Gatot Lestario's plea was rejected on 14 August 1984, yet it has 
since been established that, up to the beginning of November 
this year, neither men has been notified of the decision, nor 
apparently has the prison governor of the Pamekasan (Madura) 
Prison where they are being held . They only heard news of the 
rejections from relatives who were understandably alarmed at 
press reports about possible early executions. Thus not only have 
these men been subjected to over 15 years' imprisonment, half 
the time under death sentence; they are also being tormented by 
an outrageous disregard for their legal rights to know what is 
happening to their cases . 
Djoko Untung and Gatot Lestario were tried together in late 
1975 and sentenced to death early in January 1976. A third man, 
Basuki, was charged together with them but did not survive the 
trial ordeal; he died on 15 December 1975. When the trial 
commenced, the men asked to be defended by well-respected 
barristers, Buyung Nasution, then head of the Legal Aid 
Institute in Jakarta, and Yap Thiam Hien. In flagrant violation 
of their rights as defendants to appoint lawyers of their choice, 
the court simply ignored their request and appointed lawyers of 
its own choice . 
Prisoners' procedural rights treated with conte1Dpt 
The persistent procedural violations committed by the 
Political prisoners of the military 
HR Dharsono, retired general, 
former ASEAN Secretary-
General, arrested 8 November 
1984. 
·' 
' ~atot Lestario, PKI prisoner, 
arrested January 1969. He 
could be executed soon. 
authorities in the case of Munir have caused immense confusion 
and distress both for the convicted prisoner and for his family. 
They are typical of what many convicted prisoners have 
experienced (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 63, July 1984). In late 
1982, Munir's relatives were under the impression that his 
clemency plea had been rejected and that execution was 
imminent. After a flood of protests reached Jakarta, the 
authorities announced that his case had not yet reached the 
clemency stage, but was still under consideration by the Supreme 
Court ( kasasi). 
At the time, the official explanation was (Kompas 1 October 
1982) that Munir's appeal against sentence to the High Court 
was rejected on 23 November 1981, that he was notified of this 
nearly five months later, on 8 April 1982. Four days later, he 
submitted his kasasi plea to the Supreme Court; he could hardly 
have done it any earlier. Then, six months after the Kompas 
report, there came a report in Sinar Harapan (25 April 1983) 
that Munir's kasasi appeal had been turned down without 
coming before the Court because it was submitted after the time 
limit between High Court verdict and kasasi plea had lapsed! 
As far as ; s known, there have been no executions of 
communist prisoners (the so-called "1965 generation" of political 
prisoners) since the late 1960s although many dozens are known 
still to be under sentence of death. The sudden recent 
announcements about rejected clemency pleas have raised the 
spectre that the military may be planning to proceed with some 
executions again . Whether this is connected with their present 
political difficulties is not clear, though some generals at the top 
of the military hierarchy have implied that there was a "PKI 
connection" to the Tanjung Priok demonstration in September 
this year. 
In November 1982, the Dutch Foreign Minister, C.A. van der 
Klauw who had just made a visit to Indonesia, wrote to the 
Dutch Communist Party saying he had been assured by the 
Indonesian government that none of the outstanding death 
sentences would be carried out. But Imran bin Muhammad Zein 
was executed on 13 April 1983 and Timzar Zubil was executed 
around the same time. 
Muslim prisoner's life sentence upheld 
The East Java public prosecutor's office has also announced 
(Suara Karya, 11 October 1984) that a Muslim prisoner, Ismail 
Pranoto (Hispran) has had his life sentence upheld; his plea for 
clemency was turned down by the President on 3 August 1983. 
He is now serving his life sentence in Kalisosok Prison, 
Surabaya. 
Muhamma ris, 
Front leader recently given a 
life sentence. His defence plea 
in support of Free Aceh was 
"wildly cheered" by the crowds 
in court. (Tempo, 24 
November 1984.) 
Rachmat Basuki, deputy chair-
man of the Kaba'ah Youth 
Movement's Jakarta branch, 
arrested in October 1984 for 
alleged complicity in 4 October 
bombings. 
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Land disputes 
Government to speed up process 
of landlessness 
The Indonesian government has come out with an exraordinary 
new programme that will speed up the process of landlessness 
and impoverishment by stating that it plans "to eliminate all land 
holdings of less than half a hectare" in the near future and 
eventually "to eliminate all holdings of less than a hectare". The 
plan was revealed by the Agriculture Minister , Ir Achmad 
Affandi who said that, according to official statistics , there are 
now 8.7 million peasant families trying to live off half a hectare 
of land or Jess. This figure was given in President Suharto's 16 
August speech this year , and represented a fall from 11 million 
peasant families with such tiny plots in 1980. This trend is 
regarded by the government as "an improvement" , without 
saying anything about the circumstances of the millions of 
peasants who have been driven off their land . 
The Agriculture Minister claimed that peasants "would not 
be forced" to give up their land , although even the censored 
press in Indonesia manages to publish enough reports (see 
below) to show that this is precisely what is happening all the 
time . Peasants would, he said, "be advised" to transmigrate or to 
cultivate land now managed by nucleus estates which are 
functioning in many parts of the country. He said the 
government intends to cut the number of peasants with Jess than 
half a hectare by half before the end of the current five-year plan 
which ends in 1989. 
Commenting on the announcement, Merdeka (23 August 
1984) said that such a programme violates the basic right to own 
land. 
According to the Basic Agrarian Law, peasants who do not own any 
land or who own less than the minimum fixed by law should be given 
land to enable them to produce .. . and those who own more than 
the maximum fixed by law should have their holdings reduced. What 
is happening now is the very opposite: those with large holdings are 
being left alone while those with not enough land are to have their 
land rights eliminated. Is this what is meant by justice and progress? 
Will the peasants to be deprived of their land be given due 
compensation , asks the paper , and what about peasants in 
villages where they are being pushed around and intimidated by 
those in power locally? _ 
The following reports taken from recent issues of Jakarta 
newspapers show the worth of government pledges that force 
will not be used against peasants. 
Land cleared of fruit trees to make way for nucleus 
estate 
Many peasants in South Banten, West Java have lost their 
livelihoods because their coconut trees , clove trees, banana trees 
and coffee bushes have been cut down without their permission 
to make way for a plantation of palm-oil trees managed by a 
nucleus estate. The peasants complained that when they tried to 
resist, they were summoned by the local military officer 
(koramil) . 
The company in charge of the nucleus estate is a state-owned 
enterprise, PTP XI. When it first commenced operations a 
couple of years ago , local peasants were promised 1.5 hectares of 
estate land to care for , once the trees had become productive, as 
well as 0.3 hectares for gardens and 0.2 hectares for dwellings. 
So far, however , none of this has happened. As a result , what 
was once a busy fruit-growing region , dispatching truckloads of 
fruit to market every day , has now been turned into a ghost-
district , with peasants sitting around most of the time , waiting to 
hear whether they are going to get a share of the land now being 
cultivated by the nucleus estate . Many of the people working for 
the estate have been brought in from outside the region. 
One peasant complained that he lost trees that used to earn 
him Rp.50,000 a month from jengkol fruit alone. Another 
elderly peasant was described as sitting , crying helplessly as she 
watched her clove trees being cut down to make way for palm-oil 
seedlings . Yet another said he had lost land which contained 
nearly 600 trees growing a variety of fruits. 
Reporting this scene of injustice and deprivation, Kompas (11 
September 1984) pointed out that while so many peasants have 
lost their livelihoods , local village heads (lurah) have bee11 
enjoying a bonanza , constructing new homes and buying deisel 
colts, no doubt with the profits from pay-offs to help the nucleus 
estate acquire the land they wanted. 
Peasants being forced to sign away their land 
In another part of West Java , around the village of Mekarsari in 
the district of Pandeglang, comes an equally harrowing report. 
More than 350 peasants are being told that they must sell off 
their rice-land (sawah) so that it can be turned over to the 
construction of shrimp ponds for a private company. The 
peasants, who between them own about a thousand hectares of 
land , say that they are being so constantly harassed and 
intimidated by local government officials and the village babinsa 
(village-level army officer) that they are afraid to stay at home . 
Some say that in order to avoid meeting officials who come to 
their homes at night , they are taking refuge in nearby forests for 
the night. 
They now fear that they will lose their land rights whether 
they signed the required documents or not because many title-
deeds are already in the hands of the authorities "for renewal" . 
Some explain how these deeds were forcibly taken from them. 
The villagers, who have now sought the help of a Jakarta-based 
lawyer to protect their interests , say that in addition to their 
sawahs, land which is now used for homes , mosques and gardens 
is also to be taken from them for shrimp ponds. "Ifwe are forced 
to sell up altogether, what will become of us?" they ask . They 
insist that they are not interested in getting compensation, 
whatever the amount offcred . All they want is to be allowed to 
continue to grow rice. They feel they could not turn to trade as 
an alternative because they lack experience, whereas the 
prospects of purchasing sawah-land elsewhere are negligible . 
Source: Kompas , 3 September 1984. 
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Book reviews 
Resistance in East Timor unbowed 
Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, 
The War against East Timor, Zed Books 
Ltd and Marram Books, London; Pluto 
Press Australia, Leichhardt, NSW; In de 
Knipscheer, Haarlem. 253pp. £6.95 paper-
back (UK). [Available to TAPOL readers 
for £4.50 plus postage.] 
Much of the information to have emerged 
from behind the wall of silence that has 
surrounded East Timor since the full-scale 
Indonesian invasion of December 1975 has 
been made available only in the relatively 
ephemeral form of bulletins, newsletters 
and pamphlets . Whilst the importance of 
such sources is certainly not to be undere-
stimated, the appearance of full-length ac-
counts is always to be welcomed. Such ac-
counts1 bring together information that is 
not always readily available to a wider pub-
lic outside the international solidarity 
movement itself, and publication in book 
form opens up a broader potential for dis-
tribution . The War Against East Timor is a 
valuable addition to the available re-
sources, providing a concise but detailed 
account of the East Timorese national lib-
eration movement and of the continued re-
sistance against Indonesian aggression. It 
also covers Western collusion with In-
donesia and begins to spell out the implica-
tions of a continued war in East Timor for 
Indonesia itself. The authors draw on a 
very wide range of source material , ranging 
from statements from Fretilin to CIA intel-
ligence reports, from interviews with 
Timorese churchmen to the terrifying ac-
counts given by refugees . Its most valuable 
single contribution to our knowledge of the 
situation inside East Timor is, however, 
the publication of the full text of nine In-
donesian military documents captured by 
Fretilin in late 1982. These give the lie to 
the repeated claims made in Jakarta to the 
effect that Fretilin is a spent force and that 
the final ' integration' of East Tim or is only 
a matter of time . Whatever the Suharto re-
gime may say in public, Indonesian person-
nel on the ground are well aware of the fact 
that they face an opponent whose strength 
is growing rather than declining . 
One of the more striking features of the 
war in East Timor has always been the con-
sistency of reports from sources that are 
geographically dispersed, independent of 
one another and politically disparate. Even 
in the early stages of the invasion, the 
claims made in Fretilin's broadcasts on 
Radio Maubere were inevitably confirmed 
by outside sources and even by information 
emerging from within the Indonesian milit-
ary. The captured documents published 
here conform to that pattern . They carry 
security ratings ranging from 'Restricted' 
to 'Secret' and cover a wide variety of to-
pics: breaking up Fretilin support networks 
in villages and a 'resettlement camps', in-
16 
telligence gathering, search and destroy 
missions against suspected Falintil posi-
tions (Falintil is Fretilin's military organisa-
tion), and even the use of torture . The lat-
ter document advises that photographs 
should not be taken of torture sessions; 
they may get into the wrong hands. The 
picture of Fretilin that emerges from these 
documents is one of a resistance movement 
which is present in every village and camp, 
in every locally conscripted unit. It clearly 
possesses an intelligene network capable of 
helping Falintil to outmanoeuvere Indone-
sian units with remarkable consistency and 
ease. References to the problems caused 
by ' local loyalties' (ie . nationalism and a 
commitment to liberation) indicate a reali-
sation that integrasi is not working, despite 
the implementation of much-vaunted edu-
cational programmes designed to capture 
the hearts and minds of future generations . 
Quite simply, these are not the kind of 
counter-insurgency manuals that are issued 
to an army facing only demoralised and 
fragmented guerrilla bands. Indonesia's in-
vasion and occupation of East Timor is the 
largest military operation undertaken by 
the republic since its inception; it has yet to 
show any real signs of success. 
Fretilin' s resurgence 
The resurgence and recovery of Fretilin 
and its fighting forces are remarkable by 
any standards. The initial resistance to the 
full -scale invasion of December 1975 - in 
itself an escalation in response to the fai-
lure of the earlier incursion and destabili~a­
tion tactics of Operasi Komodo - was on 
an unexpected scale and US military plan-
ners described the Indonesian performance 
THE 
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as 'woeful'. If anything, that is an under-
statement. as by August 1976 an invasion 
force of some 32 ,000 Indonesian troops 
controlled only the major towns and com-
munications routes , with the Fretilin-held 
areas in the mountainous interior left virtu-
ally untouched. What began to turn the 
tide in Indonesia's favour was the supply of 
advanced military hardware from its West-
ern allies . A particularly important role 
was played hy US-supplied Bronco 
counter-insurgency aircraft; Falintil has 
virtually no anti-aircraft capability. In-
donesia has subsequently taken delivery of 
US Skyhawks (the backbone of the US air-
borne forces in the Indochina war) , 
British-made Hawks and helicopters from 
Australia, as well as Dutch corvettes. 
The Broncos were used extensively in 
the massive encirclement and annihiliation 
campaigns of 1977-1978 which involved 
the deployment of ground forces on a huge 
scale and which were inevitably accom-
panied by saturation bombing and straf-
fing . The third such campaign reduced re-
sistance to its lowest ebb in November 
1978, when a major Falintil base in the 
mountains to the south-east of Baucau fi-
nally fell. As Fretilin has admitted, how-
ever the defeat was not the result of milit-
ary factors alone and had a lot to do with 
its own failings and internal inadequacies, 
failures which found expression in the at-
tempts of former leaders like Xavier do 
Amaral and Alarico Fernandes to 
negotiate some kind of settlement. 
Paradoxically , the events of 1978 may have 
actually strengthened Fretilin in the long 
run by convincing the leadership of the im-
possibility of negotiating from a position of 
weakness and of the need to organise in the 
occupied zones as well as in the liberated 
areas. The captured documents, which are 
dated 1982, show the extent to which those 
lessons have been learned. 
Since 1977, Indonesian policy in East 
Timor has centred upon population control 
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and the relocation of the population into 
fortified villages in the lowlands. Tradi-
tionally, most of the population of East 
Timar lives in scattered settlements high in 
the mountains; relocation has seriously dis-
rupted agriculture and the availability of 
food supplies, leading to widespread 
famine and starvation. The fact that 
malaria is endemic in the coastal plains has 
added significantly to the death toll. All 
sources - the church, journalists and the 
few relief workers allowed in by the occu-
pation forces - agree that living condi-
tions for the civilian population are appal-
ling. The figures speak for themselves. At 
a conservative estimate, 200,000 East 
Timorese have died since 1975 as a result 
of Indonesian massacres, malnutrition and 
disease. That is roughly the equivalent of 
the UK losing twice the population of Gre-
ater London . The sheer enormity of the 
death toll is equalled by the barbarity of 
the aggressors. Rape and toture are com-
monplace; prisoners are executed as a mat-
ter of routine; suspected members of Freti-
lin are tortured to death and their bodies 
mutilated. Indonesian officers are reliably 
reported to have indulged in cannibalism in 
an attempt to demoralise and terrorise the 
population. 
Population control and counter-in-
surgency tactics may, however, be begin-
ning to have unexpected effects. The forci-
ble evacuation of the mountain population 
has given Fretilin guerrillas access to the 
gardens and other food supplies aban-
doned by the villagers. It has probably also 
given them more room to manoeuvre and 
regroup than they might otherwise have 
had. Indonesian tactics have also ensured 
that they have considerable/ numbers of 
real and potential enemies behind their 
lines; hence the emphasis on combating re-
sistance in the villages and camps in the 
counter-insurgency manuals. 
In the long term , the Indonesianisation 
of East Timar may also have a boomerang 
effect. In economic terms, Indonesianisa-
tion has meant the establishment of a plan-
tation economy on a scale undreamed of by 
the Portuguese in over five hundred years 
of colonialism. The main cash crop is high 
grade coffee, one of the country's tradi-
tional exports, and is almost entirely in the 
hands of a company known as Denok. Lit-
tle is known of the company's commercial 
organisation, but it is widely regarded as 
being a front for the business interests of 
the military; in the words of one officer, 
Denok was the only company to land in 
Dili with the marines. The authors show 
that the Indonesian doctrine of the dual 
function of the armed forces is being taken 
to new heights in East Timar, both in the 
economy and in the militarisation of the 
administration. The military men involved 
in the Indonesianisation of East Timar are 
becoming increasingly important in In-
donesia itself. Service in East Timar en-
sures accelerated promotion - particularly 
if evidence of distinguished service in the 
brutalisation and torture of the population 
is forthcoming - and facilitates entry to 
the elite Staff and Command School (Ses-
koad). Seskoad graduates and veterans of 
the Timar campaign now form a distinctive 
and powerful group within the military 
hierarchy and therefore within the ruling 
bloc in Indonesia. At their head is Benny 
Murdani, one of the original architects of 
the invasion and now concurrently head of 
State Intelligence , Commander of Kop-
kamtib and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. It is Murdani who has re-
versed his predecessors' policy of starting 
to negotiate with Fretilin (partly a political 
manoeuvre, partly an admission of the 
strength of the resistance) and who has 
adopted a no-compromise stance . It is at 
Murdani's insistence that elite paracom-
mandos are now bearing the brunt of day 
to day fighting rather than acting as shock 
troops and leaving the overall conduct of 
the war to less prestigious units. Given his 
central position in the hierarchy, a defeat 
or continued stalemate will have serious 
destabilising effects in Jakarta; after all, it 
is common knowledge that Murdani , who 
is an intelligence officer rather than a field 
commander, owes his promotion and posi-
tion to his loyalty to Suharto himself. The 
war in East Timm' may well yet prove to be 
the regime's Achilles' heel. 
Reading The War Against East Timor is 
at once a heartening and depressing experi-
ence . Heartening in that it provides conclu-
sive evidence of the continued ability of 
Fretilin and the people of East Timar to re-
sist and to fight back ever more effectively, 
despite the setbacks they suffered in 1977-
1978. Depressing in that it also gives a vivid 
and angry portrayal of the sufferings they 
have endured since 1975 . It deserves to be 
read on both counts . 
David Macey 
'The major accounts are Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: 
Nationalism and Colonialism, University of 
Queensland Press , 1978; Arnold Kohen and 
John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's In-
vasion of East Timor, Tapol , London , 1979; 
James Dunn , Timor: A People Betrayed , The 
Jacaranda Press, Queensland , 1983. 
Sawito and the Shaky Seventies 
David Bourchier, Dynamics of Dissent in 
Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup. 
Interim Reports Series, No. 63, Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1984. (102 West 
Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14850) 
At a time when the Suharto military re-
gime is facing challenges to its rule not only 
in its colonial territories, West Papua and 
East Timor but also in Java, the heartland 
of the regime, it is instructive to study the 
forms of dissent took in the seventies, a de-
cade when the regime staggered from one 
crisis to the next. Things were not going 
well for the military rulers; tens of 
thousands of troops were bogged down in a 
war against the people of East Timor that 
they couldn't possibly win, and the army's 
major source of funding, the petroleum 
company Pertamina, went bankrupt right 
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in the middle of the oil boom. As the de-
cade wore on, protests were directed not 
only at corruption and the rule of jungle 
law , but at the very legitimacy of the re-
gime . 
None of the movements which erupted 
during the seventies however had the 
stamina to survive and David Bourchier's 
analysis of the 'phantom coup' associated 
with the name of Sawito Kartowibowo 
helps to explain why. The affair was 
breath-taking in its star-studded backing; 
the centre-piece was a document entitled 
''Towards Salvation" attacking the re-
gime 's moral degradation which was signed 
by the respected, . conservative former 
Vice-President, Moh Hatta, and four 
acknowledged leaders of the main relig-
ions, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism 
and Mysticism or Javanism. Accompany-
17 
Book reviews 
ing documents called on Suharto to relin-
quish the presidency and included a letter 
of Transfer modelled on Suharto's own 
"Supersemar", the 11 March 1966 docu-
ment which he used to force Sukarno to re-
linquish his powers. 
The documents could easiiy have been 
publicly ignored by the government, as 
many other critical documents before and 
since have been ignored, but they weren't. 
Even more surprisingly, the man said to be 
at the centre of the plot, Sawito Kar-
towibowo was put on trial, giving him a 
platform from which to assail the regime to 
the cheers and frequent amusement of the 
large crowds who packed the courtroom 
and forecourt of the courthouse. Sawito's 
impressive personality, his bubbling chirpi-
ness, his reckless bravado and his irrepres-
sible conviction turned him into a folk 
hero. Some of the bolder moves taken by 
Sawito and his determined team of lawyers 
reached an even wider audience, livening 
up the drab pages of the Jakarta press, not 
to mention the photographs of the ever-
cheerful defendant waving to the spec-
tators . 
Of course, things were not easy for the 
defence . Numerous questions concerning 
the personalities supporting "Towards Sal-
vation" were declared "irrelevant" by the 
court , and none of the signatories of the 
document was allowed to testify . Bour-
chier's chapter on the trial is a most useful 
guide to the machinations of the judges and 
prosecutor in their attempts to use a politi-
cal trial for specific political purposes while 
making sure that things did not get out of 
hand. 
But why did the trial take place at all? 
As the author shows, the affair expressed 
the views of a wide-ranging coalition of re-
gime critics, left nationalists (among them 
Sawito himself) who never supported the 
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military regime, pro-PSI (Socialist Party) 
intellectuals who initially supported it but 
soon became disenchanted, and disgrun-
tled senior Armed Forces officers whose 
positions had brought them face to face 
with the corrupt practices of the Suharto 
family . One of the central figures was 
hardly ever mentioned at all - General 
Domo Pranoto, chairman of the Armed 
Forces faction in the MPR (upper 
chamber) and a close friend of Suharto 
who, as the defence proved, was the man 
who first encouraged Sawito to draft "To-
wards Salvation" . But Domo Pranoto was 
not to be allowed to testify; he died at the 
hands of army security before the trial 
began. 
The main purpose of the trial was to de-
pict the affair as the ravings of one man, to 
set Sawito up as a crank , a loner, a trickster 
who had deceived respected public figures 
to sign a document which "they hadn't read 
properly", a man convinced he had been 
chosen as Indonesia's Ratu Adil (Just Pr-
ince). But despite the constraints imposed 
by the court, the political ramifications of 
the "Sawito affair" became very clear. 
"The range of people who became in-
volved" , writes Bourchier, "hinted at a 
new kind of polarisation." True, but it was 
this very range of forces that made the 
movement sterile . Not only did it regard it-
self as just a moral force unconcerned with 
social change and interested only in chang-
ing personalities; it took no stand against 
militarism. On the contrary, the coalition 
included some of the most anti-democratic 
militarists within the Armed Forces . Un-
fortunately, this continues to characterise 
dissenter groups in Indonesia today. 
The author analyses the inter-factional 
manipulations at the top of the regime that 
surfaced around the affair. Sawito proved 
that he was in regular communication with 
the central intelligence agency, Ba kin, and 
also that the main source of information 
about the misdeeds of Suharto was the At-
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torney-General, Ali Said. In fact, the trial 
appears to have been set in motion by the 
.. AHM (Military Law Academy) faction", 
headed by Sudharmono, State Secretary, 
who runs the state apparatus and now 
chairs the government's party, GOLKAR, 
one of the most powerful men in Indonesia 
today . Ali Said was from the AHM clique 
and appears to have used Sawito to embar-
rass Suharto. Predictably, Ali Said then 
turned on the group , but by going ahead 
with the trial, the objective of embarras-
sing Suharto was nevertheless achieved. 
Not only were new facts about his family's 
corrupt practices made known, and in the 
most public of ways, but his set of beliefs, 
Javanism, were publicly ridiculed. 
The events surrounding Sawito thus 
show how Suharto was at the time unable 
to control one of the leading factions in his 
regime. Since then, the AHM faction has 
undoubtedly gained enormously in 
strength while the main competing faction, 
that of Ali Murtopo, has gone into virtual 
eclipse. Unfortunately the author does not 
discuss how this happened, except perhaps 
by implication to suggest that Suharto was 
told the price he would have to pay to keep 
Ali Said and co. quiet. 
David Bourchier's piece is an excellent 
example of the vigour of Australian 
scholarship on Indonesian affairs. Austra-
lian academics are streets ahead of those in 
the USA and Holland in their research into 
contemporary political developments in In-
donesia, most of them providing important 
insights into the workings of the military 
regime. No wonder that pro-regime intel-
lectuals in Indonesia like Subagio Sas-
trowardoyo now accuse Indonesian Studies 
in Australia of being anti-Indonesian. The 
problem with people like that is that they 
can't stand hearing some home truths 
about a political situation which they con-
done, donning the figleaf of offended pat-
riotic pride. 
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Nearly 500 officers graduated from the 
Armed Forces Academy (AKABRI) in Oc-
tober. AKABRI is now to be split up into 
academies for the separate forces ·"to rein-
force professionalism", said AKABRI Com-
mander-General, Lieutenant-General 
Moergito. (Tempo, 6 October 1984.) 
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General Suharto had a lot to offer when he 
met the directors of the US petroleum com-
pany, Diamond Shamrock, in October. The 
company plans to invest $400 million a year 
in Indonesia in petroleum, natural gas and 
coal. We like Indonesia because it's a "rela-
tively stable economy", said President-Di-
rector William Bricker. (Sinar Harapan, 18 
October, 1984.) 
Officers of "Satpam" ('units for security') 
who are in charge of vital enterprises, 
businesses and offices, were summoned to 
hear Jakarta Military Commander, Major-
General Try Soetrisno, after the 4 October 
bombings. 
With local police officers "renting out" 
firearms to the public for Rp.2.5-3 million 
a year because businessmen feel ''they can-
not depend on protection from the security 
authorities", ( Kompas, 10 October 1984), 
who knows whether the "Satpam" will im-
prove people's sense of security? 
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Muslim girls expelled from school for wearing headscarves 
Many Muslim schoolgirls in West Java are being expelled from 
school because they insist on wearing headscarves at school. 
Disciplinary action has been taken against hundreds of pupils . 
Acording to a letter in Tempo (13 October), signed by six 
schoolgirls, as many as 150 girls have been expelled from a 
number of secondary schools in Bandung and at least 600 have 
been expelled throughout the province of West Java over the 
question of headscarves . There are reports that in some schools, 
girls are not allowed to sit in classrooms but must do their lessons 
in the corridors because they refuse to remove their headscarves. 
The issue first arose a year ago when many girls organised 
protests against disciplinary action over school uniforms . It led 
to the arrest last November of Tony Ardie (see TAPOL Bulletins 
Nos 60 and 61, November 1983 and January 1984) after a speech 
at a mosque in which he attacked the government over the 
question of headscarves . 
School uniforms standardised throughout Indonesia 
Last year, the Ministry of Education introduced a regulation 
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standardising uniforms in schools throughout the country, and 
gave all schools one year in which to bring themselves into line 
with the uniforms stipulated by the Ministry. The renewed 
conflict over headscarves has emerged because schools are now 
required to conform with the 1983 regulation. 
Appeals from pupils and from religious circles for tolerance 
and flexibility have clearly fallen on deaf ears. A senior official 
of the Education Ministry wrote a letter to Tempo (27 October) 
justifying this fascist-type regulation which is aimed, he said, "at 
eliminating differences based on ethnicity, religion, race and 
group. If school uniforms are standardised, all exclusivist 
attitudes will be stamped out . . . whilst reinforcing national 
discipline and cultivating a responsible spirit of patriotism" . 
The six girls who signed the letter in Tempo complained 
bitterly that they are being treated with the same severity as 
pupils who are disciplined for fighting in the streets with pupils of 
rival schools. They report that in some schools, all the pupils 
have signed protests against expulsions over the wearing of 
headscarves, and in one school, State Secondary School 2 in 
Bandung, all pupils went on strike for three days over the issue. 
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